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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
SALES
The furnishing of blood by a hospital to a patient does not con-
stitute a sale. In Gile v. Kennewick Public Hospital District,' the
Washington Supreme Court thwarted an attempt by the plaintiff to
escape the effects of the Washington statute exempting a public hos-
pital from liability for its negligent acts. RCW 70.44.060(8) states:
A public hospital district shall have power... (8) To sue and be sued.
The district shall not be liable for negligence for any act of its officers,
agents or employees. 2
The plaintiff in this instance attempted to hold the hospital district
liable for breach of an implied warranty of fitness arising out of an
alleged sale of blood by the defendant to the deceased wife of the plain-
tiff. If successful in proving that the transfusion was a sale of blood,
the plaintiff would have established a cause of action based on strict
liability' rather than negligence and thus would not have been within
the scope of the immunity statute.'
Sarah Helen Gile entered the Kennewick Public Hospital as a paying
patient to undergo surgery on her right knee. After the operation had
been completed Mrs. Gile was given a blood transfusion to promote the
healing of the surgery. The blood supplied to her was not of the same
type as her own blood and death resulted from the transfusion. The
deceased's husband, as administrator, brought the action against the
Kennewick Public Hospital District, a municipal corporation, to re-
cover for the wrongful death of Mrs. Gile. The plaintiff based his
action on three theories: (1) for the wrongful death resulting from the
defendant's negligence, (2) for the taking of private property without
compensation, and (3) for breach of an implied warranty of fitness on
the sale of the blood and services to the deceased.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the three causes of action.
The supreme court affirmed the holding of the trial court. The first
two of the three theories on which the plaintiff based his cause of action
were dismissed on the basis of the statutory immunity of public hos-
pital districts.5 This case note will be devoted to a discussion of the
court's action on the third theory, breach of an implied warranty of
fitness on the alleged sale of blood and services by the hospital.
148 Wn2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956).
2 RCW 70.44.060(8).
2 1 TILLISTON, SALEs § 237, (rev. ed. 1948).




The court dismissed this cause of action for two reasons: (1) the
allegation of breach of warranty was simply an attempt to escape the
effects of the hospital district immunity statute, and (2) the supplying
of blood by a hospital to a patient did not constitute a sale, but rather
was incidental to a contract for services between the hospital and the
patient.
In rendering the decision that the supplying of blood was not a sale,
the court relied entirely on a New York decision.6 In the New York
case the plaintiff was given a transfusion of contaminated or bad blood
by the hospital. The patient contracted a disease as a result of the
transfusion and sued for breach of an implied warranty of fitness on
the sale of the blood. In a 4-3 decision the New York Court held that
the transfer of blood by a hospital to a patient is an incident of the
contract of service between the hospital and the patient and since this
contract is not divisible the transfer of blood does not constitute a
sale.' The Washington Court quoted extensively from the opinion of
the New York Court in adopting the theory of its argument.
There is a basic difference in the factual pattern of the New York
case from the case in question. In the New York case the cause of the
injury was the blood itself. The blood contained disease germs and was
not fit for human use. In the Washington case the cause of the patient's
death was the negligent service of the hospital staff when they errone-
ously typed the deceased's blood, and so injected blood of the wrong
type.
Before proceeding with the discussion of the court's holding it might
be well to consider further the Washington statute involved.8 The
difficulty presented by the statute is that of the legislative intent, i.e.,
did the legislature intend to protect the public hospital district from
liability for all negligent acts of its employees or only from tort actions
based on the theory of negligence? In other words, is a public hospital
district liable for the negligent acts of its employees even though the
cause of action is based on a theory of absolute liability? The instant
case indicates the hospital would not be liable. A breach of warranty
action need not be based on negligence.' What would be the result in
a breach of warranty action where negligence was not alleged and the
breach of warranty was not based on the negligent acts of the employees
of the hospital? The wording of the statute apparently would not
6 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E2d 792 (1954).
7 Id., at 108, 123 N.E.2d at 796 (dissenting opinion).
8 RCW 70.44.060 (8).
1 1 WIuIsToN, SALES § 237 (rev. ed. 1948).
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relieve the hospital from liability. Could the public hospital district
defend such an action brought against it by proving its employees were
negligent? The court does not discuss this problem.
Apparently the Washington Court has not previously examined this
statute to determine its actual meaning and scope. The language used
in the present case indicates that the court would give the statute a
broad meaning and afford the public hospital district protection from
all tort liability, even though negligence was not alleged. This is im-
plied by the court's statement that the allegation of breach of war-
ranty in the present case was simply an attempt to escape the effects of
the statute, which they would not permit.
Whether the transfer of blood in a transfusion constitutes a sale of
blood, or is simply the incident of a service, must be considered in
further detail. In differentiating between a service and a sale the courts
have laid emphasis on the question of whether the service was the pre-
dominate factor in the transaction involving the transfer of the prop-
erty,"0 but in the cases cited which discuss this question it must be noted
that the character of the item or property transferred was itself altered
by the service.
In the instant case the blood was not altered by the service of the
hospital. The blood remained in the same condition from the time it
was delivered to the hospital until it was delivered to the patient. The
transfusion was the delivery of the blood by the hospital. The blood
was not, as is usual in service contracts, the product of the services.
Therefore, the supplying of the blood does not seem to fit completely
the definition of an incident of a service.
To determine adequately whether the transfusion constituted a sale,
the court should have had additional facts relating to the actual prac-
tices of the particular hospital. Although the decision appears to be
justified on the basis of the facts presented to the court, the holding as
to the sale of blood does not seem justified when further facts are sup-
plied. Since the case came up on a demurrer these facts were not
present. It seems appropriate at this time to describe the actual oper-
10 Town of Saugus v. Perini and Sons, Inc., 305 Mass. 403, 26 N.E.2d 1 (1940).
(Sale involving the removal of gravel for road construction) ; Sidney Stevens Imple-
ment Co. v. Hintze, 92 Utah 264, 67 P.2d 632 (1937) (Sale of specially built auto
trailer) ; Crystal Recreation, Inc. v. Seattle Ass'n. of Credit Men, 34 Wn.2d 553, 209
P.2d 358 (1949) (Sale of specially constructed and installed restaurant equipment) ;
Racklin-Fagin Construction Corporation v. Villar, 156 Misc. 220, 281 N.Y. Supp. 426(1935) (Sale of specially painted picture).
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ation of Washington State hospitals in relation to the transfusion of
blood."1
It must be emphasized that the following factual situation was not
before the court. Neither the appellant nor the respondent submitted
any information regarding the actual methods of the supplying of blood
as used by the Kennewick Public Hospital. The factual pattern pre-
sented below is a typical method used by most hospitals in the state of
Washington.
When a patient is in need of a blood transfusion the hospital procures
the needed blood from an independent county blood bank. After deter-
mining the patient's type of blood, the hospital administers the trans-
fusion using the blood from the blood bank. The blood bank bills the
hospital for the blood used. At the completion of the treatment, the
hospital bills the patient, itemizing the costs as follows: a specific
charge is made for the service of typing the patient's blood, a specific
charge is made for the service of administering the blood to the patient,
i.e., the transfusion, and a specific identifiable charge is made to the
patient for the cost of the blood itself. (This is the same charge that the
blood bank charged the hospital.) The patient is informed that if he
replaces the blood at the blood bank or has someone else replace it in
his name, he will not have to pay the charge listed for the blood on the
hospital bill. If the patient has the blood replaced at the blood bank, the
blood bank credits the hospital for the cost of the blood and the hos-
pital, in turn, credits the patient's account. If the patient pays the hos-
pital the charge for the blood received, the hospital will then pay the
blood bank. If, after ninety days have passed from the time the hospital
billed the patient, the patient has neither had the blood replaced nor
paid the hospital for the blood, the hospital sends the patient's name
and address to the blood bank. On receipt of this information the blood
bank credits the hospital for the cost of the blood and undertakes on
its own to collect from the patient. At this point the hospital is relieved
from all liability for the price of the blood. If the patient should fail to
pay the blood bank or fail to replace the blood, the loss will fall on the
blood bank.
There are several possible interpretations of these business trans-
actions. It could be reasoned that the blood bank sells the blood to the
hospital, which in turn sells it to the patient. If the patient fails to pay
for the blood or replace it, then the hospital district assigns its claim to
11 A description of the standard procedure used by hospitals was derived from dis-
cussions with the hospital staffs.
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the blood bank to aid the bank in obtaining needed blood. Also, in
looking at the transaction from the patient's position, it appears that
he initially bargains with the hospital for all the goods and services
necessary for treatment. At that time, unless he is otherwise informed,
he may believe that he is buying the blood from the hospital and act in
reliance on that belief. If the hospital is acting as an agent for the
blood bank, and this is not known by the patient, the bank is an un-
disclosed principal and the hospital would be liable as the agent of an
undisclosed principal. 2
Another possible conclusion is that if a sale of the blood has taken
place, the parties to the sale are the blood bank and the patient. Be-
cause of the above facts it could be found that the hospital is merely a
conduit through which the blood passed from the blood bank to the
patient. The blood bank could be considered a vendor of the blood and
the property interest in the blood would then pass directly from the
blood bank to the patient. This transfer of property then would not be
considered an incident of a contract of service since the blood bank
offers no service other than to provide blood for sale. If the blood
should prove to be defective or contaminated, a cause of action based
on a breach of an implied warranty of quality, or fitness, arising out of
the sale would seem to accrue against the blood bank. Since under this
theory the hospital merely delivers the blood rather than sells it, there
would be no warranty given by the hospital regarding the blood itself.
Lending weight to this conclusion is the fact that the contract between
the hospital and patient, as evidenced by the bill, can be considered
divisible. As a result of the divisibility it is possible to conclude that
the hospital contracts with the patient to render all services needed,
and acting as agent for the blood bank contracts with the patient for
the sale of a specific quantity of blood.
If the sole basis of the court's decision was the finding that a sale did
not take place in the transaction involved, the sustaining of the demur-
rer would be erroneous since the court did not have sufficient facts
adequately to determine the issue. But because the decedent's death
was actually caused by the negligent typing of her blood it did not
involve a breach of warranty in the sale of the blood. Since the facts
of the case, therefore, come within the hospital immunity statute and
do not involve the absolute liability of a breach of warranty, the court's
decision to sustain the demurrer seems correct.
12 MEcHEm, AGENCY § 153 (4th ed. 1952).
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The implications of the instant case present questions that can only
be answered by future litigation. The protection afforded by the public
hospital immunity statute seems to have been broadened, but whether
it will protect a hospital district from an action based on an absolute
liability theory, such as breach of warranty where no negligence is
alleged, remains to be seen.
Another problem would be presented to the court if a case should
arise involving a cause of action against a hospital or blood bank based
on an injury resulting from the transfusion of contaminated or diseased
blood. If the entire facts of the transaction were before the court for
consideration, it seems highly questionable that the court would uphold
their decision that the supplying of blood is not a sale.
CLARK B. SnuRE
TAXATION
Inheritance Tax-Resident Vendor's Interest in Foreign Lands
as Within Taxing Jurisdiction. In re Plasterer's Estate' upheld the
power of the State of Washington to levy an inheritance tax upon a
deceased resident's interest in Alaska lands held under partially
executory contracts of sale.
At the time of testatrix' death she was a resident of Washington,
and held title to three parcels of Alaska land which she had contracted
to sell. Her Alaska executrix paid inheritance taxes to the Territory
of Alaska upon the value of these lands. Ancillary proceedings having
determined the amount due to testatrix under these contracts for sale,
the State of Washington claimed that the value of testatrix' contract
interest in these lands was also subject to the Washington inheritance
tax, pursuant to RCW 83.04.
In order to reach this decision it was necessary for the court to find
the decedent's property interest to be within the taxing jurisdiction
of the state. - Considered as Alaska realty, it definitely was not.' The
1 149 Wash. Dec. 333, 301 P.2d 539 (1956).
2 RCW 83.04.010 provides in part:
All property within the jurisdiction of this state, and any interest therein,
whether belonging to the inhabitants of this state or not, and whether tangible
or intangible, which shall pass by will or by the statutes of inheritance of this
or any other state... shall, for the use of the state, be subject to a tax measured
by the full value of the entire property...
RCW 83.04.030, concerning property outside the state, provides that property
"...subject to, the jurisdiction of the [Washington courts] for distribution pur-
poses..." is to be subject to the inheritance tax.
'RCW 83.04.030 expressly excepts from the inheritance tax "real property located
outside the state passing in fee from the decendent owner ... ." The same result would
be reached in case law, under constitutional considerations. See Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
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